Cycles and trends in the procurement system: Anticipating changes in acquisition legislation, regulation and policy

In conclusion, let me raise the question of whether the Law Panel can impact these cycles or reverse these trends. If they are regarded as historical imperatives, the answer is clearly No. But we have been urged to be bold and to try to devise a new, simplified statute that will take us back to a better day. We are going to do that, without regard to the question whether Congress will accept the solution.

There probably has never been a better time for the Panel's report than the present; the window of opportunity is open. But what the Panel recommends is going to be awfully hard to sell, even in a window-of-opportunity year. If the predictions come true about the defense budget's going down to the level of the period when Eisenhower remained a Major for 14 years, maybe Congress will be receptive to anything that adds a little bit of value to the defense dollar. With this in mind, the Law Panel is likely to be very bold in its attempt to streamline the procurement system and reduce oversight. Hope springs eternal . . . .     

Mediation,Peacekeeping And Civil War Peace Agreements

The post-civil war agreement phase is vulnerable to credible commitment problems, a lack of government capacity to implement, and/or mutual vulnerability to retribution from violating the agreement. This study’s main contribution is to demonstrate the combined utility of mediation and UN peacekeeping. Mediation builds trust and confidence and works with the parties to design an efficacious agreement conducive to, among other features, tamping down post-agreement violence. Peacekeeping stems violence and facilitates the implementation of the agreement. Agreements that are mediated and followed by UN peacekeeping are expected to be more robust in terms of staving off violence. We report the effects of the mediation–peacekeeping interaction using a method correcting for a common misinterpretation of interaction terms. We test logit and hazard models using a sample of full and partial civil war peace agreements signed between 1975 and 2011. Controlling for agreement design, democracy, and income per capita, the results indicate mediation and its interaction with peacekeeping reduce the probability of renewed/continuing violence and have a positive impact on agreement duration. We also report brief case study evidence from the 1990s peace process in Guatemala.     

NATO BENEFITS,BURDENS AND BORDERS: COMMENT

This note refutes criticism raised by Solomon about past tests used to ascertain the concordance between NATO benefits and burdens. In so doing, a case is made for keeping the benefit proxy based on exposed borders. Moreover, a truer sensitivity analysis than that offered by Solomon is suggested.     

The viability of civil war peace agreements

Civil war peace agreements are prone to collapse. While some research suggests that multiple layers of power-sharing provisions lead to more viable agreements, others have suggested that negotiated settlements are not only more likely to return to violence, but that those cases will be more deadly as a result. We suggest here that previous research has failed to address the various ways that peace agreements emerge and that this context is crucial in explaining peace agreement viability. In some situations, rebels are likely to earn those concessions through battlefield success. Governments may feel compelled to address underlying grievances in order to stop the bloodshed and ultimately maintain some political clout in the postwar regime. In other cases, however, governments may feel pressure to engage in discussions and to provide concessions by outside actors, whether in the form of diplomatic intervention, economic, or foreign military intervention. Hypotheses are tested on all civil war peace agreements identified by the UCDP Peace Agreement Data-set for 1975–2011. Findings from logit and hazard models suggest that agreements brought about in the aftermath of military intervention on behalf of rebels are more likely to endure while those earned on the battlefield (i.e., stronger rebels) do not. In addition, mediation enhances peace agreement viability, while interventions on behalf of governments tend to undermine it.